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Ethan Kleinberg, Generation Existential: Heidegger’s
Philosophy in France 1927–1961 (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 2005), xiv+294 pages.
In Generation Existential, Ethan Kleinberg seeks to investigate the reception of
Heidegger’s philosophy in France, attempting to retrace how some of  its
intellectual figures have incorporated elements of  his philosophy into their
work. To be precise, the authors engaged are mainly Sartre, Levinas, and
Blanchot, with further chapters addressing the cases of  Kojève and Beaufret.
(I place Kojève and Beaufret apart from the other three, as Kojève was teaching
and lecturing mostly on Hegel in his famed seminar in the 1930s and only
read Heidegger in order to claim that the latter was a Hegelian philosopher
[!], and Beaufret was not an original philosopher in his own right, but rather
the main commentator of  Heidegger’s work in France, albeit a highly gifted
one.) The choice of  these authors is not entirely justified in the book, and to
some extent it represents a selective decision on the author’s part, reflecting
his interests and concerns. Similarly, the three “readings” or “waves” that the
author identifies in the reception of  Heidegger in France, without being
completely arbitrary, do represent a certain interpretive understanding of  the
development of  philosophy in France in the last sixty years that would require
quite a bit of  justification. A more extensive, or exhaustive, account of
Heidegger’s reception in France may, of  course, be found in Dominique
Janicaud’s magisterial two-volume work Heidegger en France (Paris: Albin Michel,
2001), but Ethan Kleinberg’s work remains a worthy attempt, and provides a
rich and instructive narrative of  certain aspects of  this reception.
The author distinguishes three stages in that reception, “three
readings” (17) of  Heidegger’s philosophy in France: the first reading explores
the initial interpretations of  Heidegger, an interpretation qualified as
“anthropocentric, teleological, and fundamentally humanistic,” focusing on
Kojève and Sartre; a second reading engages Heidegger’s own response to
this first reading (in particular through his “Letter on Humanism”) and the
first occurrence of  the Heidegger debate in 1946–1947 with respect to his
political engagements. This second reading presents Heidegger as an
“‘ahumanist’ postsubjective philosopher” (18). The third reading explores
responses to the first two readings, as exemplified in the works of  both
Blanchot and Levinas, with the attempt to move beyond ontology to give
thought to an ethics in the wake of  the Shoah.
The author begins with a narration of  the contribution of  a young
Emmanuel Levinas, who of  course was the first to introduce Heidegger’s
work in France. A lot of  biographical information is provided on Levinas’
youth and formation, with attention given to his time in Strasbourg from
1923 to 1929; his relation to the intellectual figures of  that time, such as
Bergson; his discovery of  phenomenology; his encounter and friendship with
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Blanchot; and finally his 1928–1929 visit to Freiburg, where the young Levinas
was, as it were, navigating philosophical waters between Husserl’s
phenomenology and Heidegger’s ontological phenomenology (34). This led
to the writing of  The Theory of  Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology, a reading
informed by Heidegger’s critiques of  Husserl. Kleinberg shows with efficacy
the influence of  Heidegger’s themes on Levinas’s account of  Husserl’s
philosophy (an influence admitted by Levinas himself), in particular with
respect to his emphasis on the ontological concerns in Husserl’s
phenomenology. Levinas leaned towards Heidegger in this debate, just as he
would lean towards Heidegger in the famed 1929 Davos debate with Cassirer.
He is quoted as saying: “Cassirer was the representative of  an order that had
been defeated” (41.) He would come to regret this support in light of
Heidegger’s future involvement with the Nazi regime: “I hated myself  very
much during the years of  Hitler for having preferred Heidegger in Davos”
(42). Regarding Levinas’ 1932 article “Martin Heidegger et l’ontologie,” an
article that was widely read and discussed in French intellectual circles, the
author makes an important remark, noting that while the text presented nothing
especially original and was quite faithful to Heidegger, it was nonetheless
understood by its readers in light of  the Cartesian model of  the primacy of
the subject. This in turn led to the anthropocentric misunderstanding of
Heidegger by the authors of  the “first reading,” Kojève and Sartre.
The author has two lengthy chapters on Kojève, which might seem
a bit disproportionate or excessive in terms of  his real impact on Heidegger’s
reception in France. Kojève is of  course known for his seminar given at the
École Pratique des Hautes Etudes between 1933 and 1939 on Hegel’s
Phenomenology of  Spirit. However, the author asserts that in order to understand
the reception of  Heidegger in France, one needs to study Kojève as he read
Hegel through Heidegger (although it is more plausible to say, as the author
also admits, that Kojève read Heidegger through Hegel, that he in fact read
Heidegger as a Hegelian). Long developments follow on Hegel, and on
Kojève’s interpretations of  his philosophy in terms of  a philosophical
anthropology. It is in this context that the author returns to Heidegger and
claims that Kojève would present his thought as a “philosophic anthropology.”
The author stresses that the “participants in Kojève’s seminar came to
understand Heidegger as a philosophical anthropologist” (83). Further,
Kleinberg insists with good reason that Kojève’s seminar was formative of
numerous intellectual figures, including Jean Wahl, Raymond Aron, Jacques
Lacan, and Merleau-Ponty.
It is with Sartre, however, that Heidegger’s name became widely
known and his philosophical work publicized, albeit as deformed by Sartre’s
(mis)appropriations. As the author states, “the popularization of  Heidegger
can be attributed entirely to the work of  Jean-Paul Sartre” (111)—who, it
should be noted, did not attend Kojève’s seminar (115). Sartre reads
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Heidegger’s Dasein as consciousness—”Sartre makes it clear that he sees no
distinction between Heidegger’s Dasein and his own understanding of  human
consciousness” (135)—thus missing Heidegger’s entire effort to displace the
self  towards the event of  being and to thus break with anthropocentrism.
Effectively, as the author rightly notes, Sartre presents a Cartesian Heidegger
(151)! However, Heidegger’s own explanations in his “Letter on Humanism”
on the non-subjective dimension of  his thought, as well as Beaufret’s growing
role in Heidegger’s place in France, led to a second reading that served as a
corrective to the first.
In the second reading, Kleinberg notes an attempt to go beyond
the boundaries of  traditional French philosophy, in particular its Cartesianism
and rationalism (as is exemplified in the development of  Merleau-Ponty’s
thought). In that respect, the author explores the crucial role played by Jean
Beaufret and his opposition to the “existentialist” reception of  Heidegger.
Apart from being the disseminator of  Heidegger’s ideas in France after the
war, Beaufret’s played an important role as a professor in forming the
generations of  future scholars. Even though, as Kleinberg notes, Beaufret
was not an original thinker (158), his influence was decisive in the debates
that would follow. Beaufret was the recipient of  the “Letter on Humanism,”
a text that definitively broke with the Sartrean interpretation of  Heidegger as
a subjectivist existentialist. As the author remarks, that first reading “implied
a certain allegiance to humanism, individuality, freedom, and responsibility
that owed more to the legacy of  the Enlightenment project than to the work
of  Heidegger” (183)—a claim that may well be true to some extent, but one
might also suggest that the themes of  freedom, individuality, and responsibility
are not absent in Heidegger’s work but undergo there a radical displacement
and reelaboration. The decisive break was instead between a subjectivist
understanding of  philosophy and a thinking that attempts to overcome it,
between a traditional humanism or anthropocentrism and another thought
of  the human displaced towards being. As Dominique Janicaud makes clear:
“At the center of  everything for Sartre: man; for Heidegger: being.” Indeed,
for Janicaud, “Sartre displays a total incomprehension [inintelligence totale] of
Heidegger’s attempt” (Heidegger en France, vol. 1, pp. 64, 66).
The author returns in this second reading to the “Heidegger affair”—
to Sartre’s initial “defense” of  Heidegger’s political engagement, his distinction
between the thinker and the man, and his famous declaration that Heidegger
the man “has no character” (170). Kleinberg shows how the attacks on
Heidegger (coming from both the left and the center-right) were connected
to broader attacks on existentialism. A series of  articles appeared in 1946 by
Maurice de Gandillac (a “visitor with some reservations”), Frédéric de
Towarnicki (a “Heidegger enthusiast”), Karl Lowith (a former student of
Heidegger who reworked for the occasion a 1939 essay), and in 1947 by Eric
Weil (a former student of  Cassirer) and Alphonse de Waelhens (a Heidegger
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commentator), followed by an exchange of  letters between the two men.
Lowith’s essay argued for an intrinsic connection between Heidegger’s
philosophy and his political engagement, a claim disputed by de Waelhens.
Eric Weil relied on a normative critique of  Heidegger’s lack of  responsibility.
Those various positions, the author argues, would come to define decades of
debates on Heidegger’s relation to the Nazis.
This question of  politics led to a third moment or “reading” in Heidegger’s
reception in France, focusing on the event of  the Shoah and its consequences
for the world of  thought. Such a confrontation is to be found in the work of
Levinas and Blanchot, who would attempt to go beyond Heidegger towards
the elaboration of  an ethical thought. Both Blanchot and Levinas are presented
as attempting to criticize the ontologism of  prior readings, or their reliance
on totality: “Blanchot and Levinas used and confronted Heidegger in an
attempt to reestablish the possibility of an ethical system of thought in the
aftermath of  the Shoah” (245). (This claim needs to be qualified since clearly,
for Levinas, it could not be a question of  establishing an ethical system, as the
model of  the system participates in the same philosophy of  totality that Levinas
seeks to overturn.) Kleinberg shows that for Blanchot the central issue in
rethinking philosophy “hinges on the issue of  culpability and responsibility”
(213) through a confrontation with the event of  the Shoah. In relation to
Heidegger, the point is made that Blanchot undertakes a confrontation with
Heidegger on the issue of  ethical responsibility. The assumption here is that
Heidegger’s thought has nothing to offer in terms of  ethical responsibility, a
claim that could not sustain the test of  a serious reading of  Heidegger’s work.
The author here follows Levinas, who attempted to confront ontology from
the perspective of  the ethical challenge of  the other. The author devotes his
last chapters to some readings of  both thinkers through some clear and original
analyses. Ironically, it is the very same author, Levinas, who had first introduced
Heidegger to France in the late 1920s and led to the first reading, that is now
shown to represent the eventual third wave of  readings of  Heidegger, a reading
that attempts to move beyond Heidegger’s thought. Kleinberg ends his work
with a third perspective, opening onto a future of  Heidegger’s thought in
France.
 As a whole, while the book is an interesting and valuable intellectual
history of  the reception of  Heidegger in France, the story is somewhat selective
and many thinkers are regrettably left out. One thinks here of  course of
Merleau-Ponty, mentioned briefly in the course of  the work, of  Derrida, who
was a major figure in the understanding of  Heidegger’s thought in France
from the sixties on and who is strangely absent from this narrative apart from
a few quick mentions, but also Lyotard, Bourdieu, Lacoue-Labarthe (on the
political debate), Foucault, Nancy and so many other central French figures
(for instance, the relation of  Deleuze to Heidegger deserves exploration and
be no doubt yield fascinating developments). As mentioned above, it is an
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intellectual history and as such displays the expected limits of  such an approach
in the understanding and treatment of  philosophical questions. Although
generally accurate and faithful, the analyses are somewhat limited in their
philosophical depth, and references to the secondary literature are somewhat
lacking. Many important philosophical texts, articles or books, are not
mentioned or if  mentioned, not engaged sufficiently. For instance, Dominique
Janicaud’s incontournable two-volume work is only briefly mentioned (in the
description of  Heidegger’s visit to Cerisy), but not examined in any significant
way. Nonetheless, Ethan Kleinberg’s book makes for an interesting read, and




Marc Crépon, Altérités de l’Europe (Paris: Galilée, 2006),
205 pages.
Marc Crépon’s remarkable new geography of  spirit takes on a series of  major
problems—political, cultural, and linguistic—and offers something of a
conceptual framework and form for thinking about Europe. Some of  these
public engagements are, in a sense, relatively recent (the sense of  European
citizenship; the encompassing of  national particularisms; the openness of
“Europe” to other—and particularly non-Christian—countries and
populations), while others are long-standing and even overwrought (the
meaning of Europe after the conclusion of its colonial domination and
disasters; after two World Wars and the Cold War, the legacies that Europe
bears; the linguistic and cultural and political clashes that it enwraps and
disguises). In eight chapters, organized around careful and motivated readings
of  Valéry, Adorno, Herder, Mandelstam, Patocka, and Derrida, Crépon
mobilizes a conceptual and interpretive apparatus that casts Europe as a
composition that exceeds local identities and identitarianisms and is instead
premised on its continual self-transformation and self-differentiation thanks
to both its internal and external others; on translation, obligation, and
inheritance without belonging; on a recognition of the violence inherent in
the history of  nation and empire; and, last but not least, on a decentered
notion of  reason that upholds a Kantian and post-Kantian universalism andat
the same time, following twentieth-century criticisms of  that tradition, refuses
to impose itself  upon or reduce other cultures and worlds.
It is appropriate to begin by highlighting two central issues involved
in reviewing this work. First, Altérités de l’Europe occupies an important position
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in its author’s overall oeuvre. It does not merely extend his readings of  the
European philosophical tradition from Nietzsche through Derrida, but also
offers a node from which to reorganize his earlier work. It also links certain
of  his principally philosophical examinations (of  nationalism, language,
difference, the “we,” futurity, and so on) to his more political engagements,
such as his L’imposture du choc des civilisations (2002), or his more recent call, with
Bernard Stiegler, for Europeans to Réenchanter le monde (2006). In this sense, it
forms a third node beside Les Géographies de l’esprit and the studies of  Nietzsche,
which already opened to a thinking of  Europe. As I will suggest, recognizing
the position of  this book in Crépon’s writing is important to understanding it.
Second, it is necessary to clarify what this book is not. It is not an intellectual
history of  the notion of  Europe, or of  the transformation of  Europe during
a certain period. Nor is it a specific historical discussion of  the emergence of
ideas that would provide a certain positive imagination of  Europe. Moreover,
while Crépon does address several contemporary political problems—the
question of  Turkey (19-23), a 2005 French law on the “accomplishments of
French repatriates” (24-26), the European Constitution (55), fears of  a
common language (47)—he is aware of  the difficulty of  locating his arguments
in any directly political or even conceptual-political realm. As a result, the
book adopts an approach whose particularity relies on an evasion of  both a
historicist treatment of  Europe and a downright formal conception of  it.
What Altérités de l’Europe does do is offer something between a hope and a
geo-philosophical program—perhaps it would be best to say that it offers a
criterion concerning what suffices as a political, ethical, and conceptual treatment of
Europe. To support this program, Crépon offers a certain genealogy of  the
past that Europe has inherited; of  other pasts (internal or otherwise) it has
related to; a system for its continual reformulation; and a specific engagement
with the possibility of  its future.
Altérités de l’Europe begins with a reading of  Valéry’s La Crise de l’esprit
and “Mais qui est donc Européen?” which offers a first approach of  European
identity in terms of  a composition. Approaching critically Valéry’s iteration of
the (today classic) designation of  Europe as a product of  Greece, Rome and
Christianity, Crépon marks the significance of  Valéry’s treatment (and its
political import today, given in particular the question of  Turkey’s status in
the EU) by noting that Valéry does not treat these origins as belonging to, or
being characteristic of, Europe. Rather, they allow for Europe’s
“transformation” (14), which occurs thanks to Europe’s dual (and
contradictory) self-formation, at once a continuous internal reorganization
and an exit beyond itself—in other words, a dual engagement with itself  and
with its others. Crépon names each aspect of  this process (as well as their
overall product) a composition (16, 18; also 86–87). “L’Europe est le produit
d’un rêve qui n’a jamais été celui d’une identité à soi ou d’un repli sur soi, mais
d’une autodifférenciation, renouvelée, à chaque étape de son histoire, par la
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critique de chacune de ces deux compositions” (15). This first major definition
of  Europe allows for internal differentiation, a concurrent import and
exchange of  elements, and a disappropriation of  singularist, identitarian, and
exclusivist claims to cultural, linguistic, and national dominance.
Crépon moves his Europe in three principal and interwoven thematic
directions: translation (16) and the “cohabitation” of  languages (52); the
“memory of  empire” and the interaction between languages and cultures as
a blend of cross-cultural and cross-linguistic mixture and loss (81-86); and
the European inheritance of  its history as one of  appropriation, violence,
and loss. This takes place in chapters 1-4, with interpretations of  Adorno (on
one’s own language), of  Europe’s different forms of  appropriation from other
cultures, of  Herder (on the “Old Europe” and on identity as mélange and
loss), and of  Mandelstam (on the nation). These interpretations double as
clarifications and redraftings of  the vector of  Europe qua alterity. For example,
in the case of  Adorno’s 1950s texts on the subject’s relation to his or her own
language (which recall Crépon’s earlier’s analysis of  Kafka and especially
Derrida in Langues sans demeure [2005]), the author seeks to establish Europe
as a complex and interwoven linguistic terrain whose inhabitants construct
themselves as Europeans precisely by moving between languages, establishing
a mobility of  idiom, and a capacity to produce meaning regardless of  basic
separations of  borders or cultural difference (39). From the reading of  Adorno
and the “other love of  one’s language” emerges also an image of  translation
as a station for the molding of European linguistic/cultural identity; in
“Mémoires d’empire,” this notion of  translation becomes a political argument.
Centering on the different possible modes of  receiving and being influenced
by an ostensible “outside,” this chapter seeks to establish the dependence of
Europe on what it has exploited and appropriated, and argues confidently for
a distinction between exploitation, import, and translation. Translation here
becomes the only ethically acceptable option, insofar as it demonstrates that
“aucune culture ne s’appartient” (55) by submitting a culture to a
transformation, a self-estrangement triggered by the stimulus. Similarly, the
chapter on Mandelstam, centered on the problem of  national exceptionalism
and messianism, evokes the problematic history of  nations in the twentieth
century, advocating “negative determinations” (108) of  Europe that would
allow for a “new type of  belonging” that renders national belonging obsolete
(109).
The fifth chapter, which bears the book title, offers a convincing
reading of  Jan Patocka’s writings on Europe from the 1930s through the
1970s. Crépon’s attention to Patocka’s readings of  Husserl, phenomenology,
and science and technology, redeploys and reinterprets the conceptual
confluence developed up to this point, showing anew how Europe makes
itself  into its other (“se fait l’autre d’elle-même,” 117), and pointing to dangers
inherent in alternative formulations of  Europe (esp. 119). In Patocka’s notion
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of  Europe as a “super-civilization”, Crépon finds Europe as the vocation
(118) of  a universal rationality at once open to its others, as well as the bearer
of  a certain non-violent universalist humanism (138). Without this kind of
thinking, writes Crépon echoing Patocka, rationality destroys itself  (133), turns
into a totalitarianism, falls to a teleological notion of  science and technology
(140), or otherwise fails to think the phenomenological “world” in the plural
(149). Thus it ultimately fails to understand the extent to which its identity is
its alterity (and vice versa). The universalized, decentered notion of  reason
(125, 149) instead offers precisely the crucial node around which the
conceptions of  inheritance, translation, and cultural mixture can come to
point toward the future, toward an imaginable liberation (125) and against the
loss of hope (144).
The significance and interest of  Crépon’s readings should be evident
by now. Crépon’s philosophical investments and political argument are
interesting and refreshing for the way they direct and organize into a thinking
of  Europe what has taken place in the ethical, political, and religious turns of
French post-phenomenological and deconstructive thought. In each chapter,
Crépon argues with an eye toward shaping a historicity of  Europe in terms
of  a memory and legacy that informs the possibility of  a future for Europe;
he moves from the geographical toward the play of  differance, from identity
to a form of  continual self-transformation. In the process, he traces a hope
and a responsibility (182, 194, 196-97) for the “we” Europeans can claim.
With Nietzsche’s ghost and promise haunting the whole work, the futurity of
this “we” is essential and consequential. How, asks Crépon, “to speak in the
first person plural as citizens of  Europe” (72, also 56), how to deal with the
double bind of  formulating an identification that is its own disidentification,
and a belonging that is its own “disappropriation” (198)? It is in addressing
this question that he reaches a hopeful stance for Derrida’s “perhaps, Europe”
and sees his “we” as a group of  wanderers among their languages’ shadows
(199) seeking forever to define themselves against all logics of  the proper,
appropriation, and appurtenance (122-25) and to produce a culture and
memory singular in its continual reinvention and intrusion upon itself. And it
is this “we” that determines what I earlier referred to as the criterion this work
seeks, that sets the task and responsibility of  Europe.
I have insisted on the term “criterion” because it is in a sense the
equilibrium of  close reading and strategic motivation that directs Crépon’s
readings and particularly the delicate development of  his argument. Some
readers may find the contrast of  translation with import and exploitation
somewhat too hopeful; others might ask to what extent certain lieux d’héritage
et de mémoire (for example Classical Greece, Christianity, or the French
Revolution, to name but three, the first two of  which are discussed under the
headings of  both Valéry and Patocka) are so central to be actually proper to
any understanding of  Europe today, particularly given Crépon’s definition.
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Still others, perhaps too indebted to a distinction between Enlightenment
and Counter-Enlightenment, might object to Crépon’s choice of  Herder as
the thinker to support the claim that: “What [Europe] has lost: the possibility
of  pretending to incarnate the culture of  humanity, wisdom, peace, or right,
without immediately recalling its past of  exploitation and devastation” (94).
For the present reviewer, a more interesting question concerns Crépon’s almost
formalist presentation of  Europe, whereby the latter comes to be identified
with paradoxes and problems inherent in a notion of  identity—particularly
as regards an alterity that concurrently borders on becoming a positive
substitute for identity while remaining its other. To what extent does Crépon
offer “Europe” as a name for this notion of non-identitarian identity—a
composite (86–87), a constantly self-transforming (117) identity based on a
continual play with alterity? To what extent is the play of  identity and alterity
the form of  the Europe Crépon wants? And where would the harmony of  this
identification of  the two fail?
I pose these questions in light of  the company that Altérités de l’Europe
keeps, such as Jacques Derrida’s, Denis Guénoun’s, and Etienne Balibar’s
important treatments of  Europe, or, to look just a bit further, Stanley Cavell’s
and Richard Rorty’s treatments of  America. It is great company, and deserved,
as Crépon’s work, both in this book and in the works rethought, extended,
and reorganized by this book, offers an important moment in recent thought
on Europe. One wishes that Europe were not so likely to fail the responsibility,
task, and hope offered  here.
Stefanos Geroulanos
New York University
